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I. ENVIRONMENT: THE LAW ABLAZE
That there are rules of law for protection of the environ-
ment is evidence of the capacity of the law to address itself to the
felt needs of the community. It is, after all, a primary charac-
teristic of the law that it defines those values that a society holds
in highest esteem, and to which it accords special protection.
Some matters may be left to the realms of voluntarism; the law,
with its coercive force, is invoked when the interests are of
special importance, and when it becomes evident that they can-
not be maintained without special sanctions.
The law of environment now seems suddenly ablaze, a
development which has taken place essentially within the last five
years. Hundreds of years ago, of course, the courts were working
out a common law of nuisance that served to protect the con-
cerns of environment that were important for that day, concerns
that we now see as having been tied to the land and to protection
of property. But the common law of yesteryear and old statutes
given new twists,1 though still part of the legal scene, are
dwarfed by the developments of the last decade.
* This Article represents an amplification and reworking of remarks included in an
address given under the auspices of the Committee on Science and the Law of the Bar
Association of the City of New York on May 23, 1973.
t Circuit Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit.
A.B. 1934, LL.B. 1936, Columbia University.
'E.g., Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899, 33 U.S.C. §§ 407-414 (1970).
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The legislative burst which kindled the present blaze differs
in two significant respects from legal developments in the com-
mon law setting. First, in promulgating rules to protect the
environment against damage by citizens, the new statutes add the
feature of administrative implementation through rules and or-
ders rooted in technical expertise and inquiry. Examples include
major antipollution laws such as the Clean Air 2 and the Water
Pollution Control Acts.3 More startling is a second trend, how-
ever, the passage of legislation to protect the environment
against the government, such as the "action forcing" procedures
of the National Environmental Policy Act4 (NEPA).
Under the current arrangement the courts no longer have
the major role they once discharged in the direction formulation
of the pertinent legal rules, notwithstanding romantics like Pro-
fessor Sax who wish the courts might still be given primary
responsibility for the articulation of those rules.5 Primary re-
sponsibility has been vested in executive officials and indepen-
dent regulatory agencies. But this is not to say that the courts do
not have an important role. They have a role of review which has
been of major significance. In exercising this role, they have
shared the public sense of urgency reflected in the new laws, and
working within the framework of existing legal doctrine, have
exerted a pervasive influence over the legislation's implementa-
tion. Of course, the vigor with which the federal courts initially
assumed the task of reviewing governmental decisions with im-
pacts on the environment has been tempered somewhat by
reflection on the practicalities faced by agencies and executive
officials. This tempering may be hastened by the energy crisis.
But the mark, once writ on paper, can never be wholly erased.
Rather than focus on the multiple doctrines of substantive
law emerging out of the implementation of environmental pro-
grams, this Article will inquire into the role of the courts in the
new regulatory context. It will trace this role in the two strands
of the new law, concentrating principally on the courts' enforce-
ment of NEPA and their supervision of decisionmaking by the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), which has assumed
primary responsibility for administering recent pesticide and
pollution control legislation.
6
2 42 U.S.C. § 1857 (1970).
3 33 U.S.C.A. § 1151-75 (1973).
442 U.S.C. §§ 4321-47 (1970).
J. SAX, DEFENDING THE ENVIRONMENT (1971).
6 This specialist agency was created pursuant to Reorganization Plan No. 3 of 1970,
42 U.S.C. § 4321 (1970).
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II. THE RULE OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
A. An Explication of the Rule
The problems of allocation of roles between agency and
court are not newly sprung in the context of environmental
matters. They have a history in other contexts. In Greater Boston
Television Corp. v. FCC,7 I sought to delineate the "requirements
of the Rule of Law, as established by Administrative Law
doctrine. '8 The first postulate of the rule elaborated in that
opinion is that the court has a supervisory function of review of
agency decisions. This begins with enforcing the requirement of
reasonable procedure, fair notice and opportunity to the parties
to present their case, and it includes examining the evidence and
fact findings to see both that the evidentiary fact findings are
supported by the record and that they provide a rational basis
for inferences of ultimate fact.
In the exercise of the court's supervisory function, full
allowance must be given for the reality that agency matters
typically involve a kind of expertise-"sometimes technical in a
scientific sense, sometimes more a matter of specialization in
kinds of regulatory programs."9 Nevertheless, the court must
study the record attentively, even the evidence on technical and
specialist matters, "to penetrate to the underlying decisions of
the agency, to satisfy itself that the agency has exercised a
reasoned discretion with reasons that do not deviate from or
ignore the ascertainable legislative intent."'1 It must ensure that
the agency "has given reasoned discretion to all the material facts
and issues."" The court exercises this aspect of its supervisory
role with particular vigilance if it "becomes aware, especially
from a combination of danger signals, that the agency has not
really taken a 'hard look' at the salient problems, and has not
genuinely engaged in reasoned decisionmaking.' 2 Finally, if
satisfied on these points, the court sustains an agency even
though its findings are "of less than ideal clarity, if the agency's
path may reasonably be discerned."'13 The court is not to make
its own findings, or select policies.
The entire process combines 'judicial supervision with a
7444 F.2d 841 (D.C. Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 923 (1971).
°Id. at 850.
°Id.
101d.
1Id. at 851.
12 Id. (emphasis added).
13 Id.
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salutary principle of judicial restraint." It is conducted with an
awareness that agencies and courts together constitute a "part-
nership in furtherance of the public interest" 14 and that the two
are collaborative instrumentalities under which the "court is in a
real sense part of the total administrative process, and not a
hostile stranger to the office of first instance."'
5
B. Supervision Under the Rule of Administrative Law
in the Environmental Field
A broad question arises, whether the general rule of ad-
ministrative law and the relative roles of courts and agencies, are
to be modified in any way, expressly or in practice, because of
the special characteristics of environmental problems. Argu-
ments can be made that the technical complexity which fre-
quently marks environmental cases should restrict the reviewing
role of the courts. The technical problems are real ones, and
perhaps they will result in more restraint and less supervision so
far as courts are concerned. At the outset, however, a fair
assessment of judicial developments must put it that in the
environmental field the courts so far have been, if anything, fully
vigilant to exercise rather than abdicate their supervisory role.
The solicitude which has generally characterized judicial
review of environmental issues was perhaps most openly ex-
pressed in the January 1971 opinion of our court in Environmen-
tal Defense Fund, Inc. v. Ruckelshaus. 6 Chief Judge Bazelon stated:
We stand on the threshold of a new era in the history of
the long and fruitful collaboration of administrative
agencies and reviewing courts. ...
[C]ourts are increasingly asked to review adminis-
trative action that touches on fundamental personal
interests in life, health, and liberty. These interests have
always had a special claim to judicial protection, in
comparison with the economic interests at stake in a
ratemaking or licensing proceeding.
7
This expression by our court was a reasonably clearcut
precursor of the Supreme Court's March 1971 opinion in Citizens
to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 18 where the Supreme Court
articulated a similarly watchful approach to environmental pro-
14 1d.
15Id. at 852.
16 439 F.2d 584 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
17Id. at 597-98.
18401 U.S. 402 (1971).
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tection in discussing the scope of authority given the Secretary of
Transportation by the Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1968. That
Act provides that the Secretary may-not authorize use of federal
funds to finance construction of highways through public parks
if a "feasible and prudent" alternative route exists. The Govern-
ment contended that apart from engineering considerations of
what is "feasible," the Secretary had discretion in the determina-
tion of what is "prudent' to engage in -a broad balancing of
competing interests, such as cost and safety. The Court said:
Congress clearly did not intend that cost and dis-
ruption of the community were to be ignored by the
Secretary. But the very existence of the statutes indi-
cates that protection of parkland was to be given paramount
importance. The few green havens that are public parks
were not to be lost unless there were truly unusual
factors present in a particular case or the cost or com-
munity disruption resulting from alternative routes
reached extraordinary magnitudes.' 9
The decision was not to be entrusted to the untrammeled
discretion of the official; it was subject to judicial review -under
the Administrative Procedure Act (APA)20 because there was
"law to apply." Moreover, the Court was prepared to follow
through with new procedural tools in making certain that judi-
cial scrutiny of the administrative official's action would be effec-
tive.
Although the Secretary was not required by the highway
statute to make fivdings and was not subject to a judicial review
to determine whether his decision was supported by "substantial
evidence," the Supreme Court held that the district court "must
conduct a substantial inquiry." After reciting the maxim that his
action is entitled to a presumption of regularity, the Court
cautioned: "that presumption is not to shield his action from a
thorough, probing, in-depth review."?' The court must give
"scrutiny" to the facts to see whether the Department acted
within the reasonable range of its authority, and must go further
to see whether there was an abuse of discretion. "To make this
finding the Court must consider whether the decision was based
on a consideration of the relevant factors and whether there has
been a clear error of judgment.
'22
19 Id. at 412-13 (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted).
20 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-59 (1970).
21401 U.S. at 415.
22 Id. at 416. The impact of Overton Park is subject to the unanimous per curiam
1974]
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What this comes down to, I think, is the "hard look" concept
central to the rule of administrative law. The court does not
make the ultimate decision, but it insists that the official or
agency take a "hard look" at all relevant factors. And when the
matter is not brought to court on a direct review procedure, as to
a court of appeals after some kind of inquiry on a more or less
formal record, the court, in this case the district court, is au-
thorized to probe the matter.
On remand, the district court -indeed conducted a
"thoroughgoing inquiry.123 It devised procedures to supplement
the administrative record. Plaintiffs had discovery, first to de-
termine whether the record as filed was complete, then to
explore the mental processes of the decisionmakers, in the ab-
sence of filed findings by the Secretary. They were allowed to
offer expert testimony to evaluate the investigation of alternative
routes by the Secretary. And they were given the opportunity to
show that there were in fact feasible and prudent alternative
routes, because such a showing "would undercut the good faith
of the administrative investigation. 24 Finally, there was a ple-
nary hearing, consuming twenty-five trial days, numerous ex-
hibits and extensive posttrial briefings. This is the "hard look"
doctrine in spades.
The treatment of Overton Park may suggest to some, in fact,
that an even more stringent standard is at work in environmental
cases than is usually comprehended by the "hard look"
metaphor. I do not think that this view accurately explains what
happened in Overton Park, however, or what has been happening
in othe'r cases. The "paramount importance" attributed to en-
vironmental values serves to grab the court initially and causes
the court to be especially attentive in its review and, where
necessary, to delve into the decisional process-to see whether
the Government has acted to give due protection to the envi-
ronment. But "[a]lthough this inquiry ... is to be searching and
careful, the ultimate standard of review is a narrow one. The
Court is not empowered to substitute its judgment for that of the
agency.25
opinion in Camp v. Pitts, 411 U.S. 138 (1973), which held that on a complaint challenging
denial of a national bank charter as arbitrary and capricious, the district court was not
authorized to conduct a de novo evidentiary hearing that would displace the administra-
tive record already made. Overton Park was distingushed as a case where there was no
contemporaneous explanation of the agency decision. Where effective explanation is
lacking, the court could apply Overton Park, not to hold a de novo evidentiary hearing,
but "to obtain from the agency, either through affidavits or testimony, such additional
explanation of the reasons for the agency decision as may prove necessary." Id. at 143.
23 335 F. Supp. 873 (W.D. Tenn. 1972).
24 Id. at 877.
25401 U.S. at 416.
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The observation that the rule of administrative law, guides
court review of environmental cases does not, however, take us
very far. The implications of the rule depend on a number of
variables. The role of the courts in environmental matters is
significantly shaped, in my view, by whether the agency or
official under review is one whose primary function is or is not
environmentally oriented. This principle governs the organiza-
tion of the observations which follow and indeed serves as one of
their basic themes.
III. ROLE OF COURTS IN SUPERVISING ENVIRONMENTAL
CONSIDERATION BY AGENCIES WHOSE PRIMARY ROLE
is NONENVIRONMENTAL
A. The Courts in the Setting of NEPA
1. Institutional Alternatives
It is the premise of NEPA that environmental matters are
likely to be of secondary concern to agencies whose primary
missions are nonenvironmental. 6 From this vantage point,
NEPA looks toward having environmental factors play a central
role in the decisions of such agencies. This_ goal does not mean
environmental considerations are to be more important than
every nonenvironmental agency mission; questions of housing,
energy and inflation might have equal claim or even higher
priority. But it does mean that environmental factors must serve
as significant inputs to governmental policy and must be weighed
heavily in the decisional balances. It is the function of review
under NEPA to ensure that this purpose is served.
Given the premise of the Act, it is clear that the review
required to safeguard its objective must be conducted by an
institution that is "independent" in the sense that it is not caught
up in the agency's mission as its reason for being and basis for
succeeding. There are broadly three possible forums for review
that meet this requirement: Congress, superagencies in the ex-
ecutive branch, and the courts.
Congress suffers the disability of severe time constraints
which make it impractical to review numerous individual cases of
agency decisionmaking. In a few cases of overriding national
26 In recent years the mass of environmental litigation involving nonenvironmental
agencies has arisen under NEPA with its requirement of environmental impact state-
ments. But even before NEPA, considering the environment was a duty imposed on some
nonenvironmental agencies and enforced by the courts. The most dramatic case was
Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v. FPC, 354 F.2d 608 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied,
384 U.S. 941 (1966).
19741
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importance Congress has acted as the final arbiter of whether the
policies and aims of NEPA have been satisfactorily implemented.
The Alaskan Pipeline controversy is perhaps the most notable of
these. 7 But the paucity of such exceptions only proves Congress'
reluctance to assume the primary review function.
Nor did Congress establish a new superagency for review of
all decisions, although it has granted two agencies within the
executive branch a limited supervisory role over the implementa-
tion of NEPA by other agencies. The Council on Environmental
Quality (CEQ) issues "guidelines" governing the preparation of'
impact statements under the Act.2 8 It also has a broad mandate
"to review and appraise the various programs and activities of
the Federal Government in the light of the policy set forth" by
NEPA,'2 9 and it is empowered by executive order to "seek resolu-
tion of significant environmental issues"30 that might come to its
attention. Under the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970, EPA
itself is required to review and comment in writing on aspects of
any federal action subject to section 102(2)(C) of NEPA which
fall within the agency's particular expertise.3 If the Adminis-
trator determines that the proposed action is "unsatisfactory
from the standpoint of public health or welfare or environmen-
tal quality,"32 he is to refer the matter to CEQ. Under this
arrangement, neither CEQ nor EPA can make an authoritative
disposition of the case before it. These agencies, in their review
capacities at least, have been compelled by Congress to make
their views felt, if at all, through informal intraexecutive proces-
ses. They have not therefore been sufficiently severed from the
influence of the mission agencies to justify categorization as
independent review bodies.
The reluctance of Congress to take the superagency ap-
proach to NEPA review, and its decision to opt for the courts
instead, may have stemmed from an uncertainty that it could
rely on any new institution to combine a supervisory role with an
attitude of restraint. This predominant characteristic was already
a feature of the courts, well-established in nonenvironmental
2 7 See Act of Nov. 16, 1973, P.L. 93-153 § 203(d), 87 Stat. 585. See also Federal-Aid
Highway Act of 1973, P.L. 93-87 § 154(a), 87 Stat. 276, which effectively blocked the
application of NEPA to a portion of the San Antonio North Expressway by taking the
link off the federal-aid system and thereby overrode the result reached by the Fifth
Circuit in Named Individual Members of San Antonio Conservation Soc'y v. Texas
Highly Dep't, 446 F.2d 1013 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 933 (1972).
28 See Exec. Order No. 11,514, § 3(h), 3 C.F.R. 286 (1973), 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (1970).
2942 U.S.C. § 4344(3) (1970).
31 Exec. Order No. 11,514, § 3(a), 3 C.F.R. 286 (1973), 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (1970).
3' 42 U.S.C. § 1857h-7(a) (1970).3 2 Id.
516 /
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cases under the general rule of administrative law. The courts
had long been accustomed to do equity, interpret statutes, assure
executive conformance to the legislative command, and at the
same time avoid intrusion into areas governed by policy and
discretion rather than law. Furthermore, the judiciary had
proven that it could carry out these functions with the indepen-
dence and the integrity needed to be responsive to policy consid-
erations that could not command, on any particular decision, the
broad constituency necessary to impel corrective congressional or
executive action, even though the policies to be enforced might
have wide public support, as in the case of NEPA.
It might also be noted at this juncture that Congress has
relied upon federal courts of general rather than special jurisdic-
tion to discharge the function of review in the environmental
area. The desirability of a specialist court has been the subject of
active debate recently, stimulated in part by a provision of the
Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972 which or-
dered the Attorney General to review "the feasibility of establish-
ing a separate court, or court system, having jurisdiction over
environmental matters.133 The Attorney General's report has
recommended against the establishment of such a court,34 and
although certain remarks that I made in the International Harves-
ter opinion have been used by proponents of an environmental
court to support their position,35 I am skeptical of the proposal.
This skepticism derives in part from a sense of the intense
pressures to which special interest groups would subject an
environmental court. The selection of judges, for instance,
would become a political event threatened by the possibility that
one or the other group would consistently dominate the choice.
This fear is borne out by the fate of the Commerce Court, which
was established as a special forum for the review of decisions by
the ICC and was abolished three years after its creation at least
in part because Congress feared that it was being captured by the
railroads at the expense of the public interest.
36
A second criticism is based on the view of the appellate
judge's role which I have just outlined..Review to ensure balance,
3 P.L. 92-500, § 9, 86 Stat. 899.
34 REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT, ACTING THROUGH THE ATTORNEY GENERAL, ON THE
FEASIBILITY OF ESTABLISHING AN ENVIRONMENTAL COURT SYSTEM VII-1 to VII-4 (1973)
[hereinafter cited as ENVIRONMENTAL COURT SYSTEM].
3 5 See Whitney, The Case for Creating a Special Environmental Court System-A Further
Comment, 15 Wm. & MARY L. REv. 33, 45 (1973).
36See ENVIRONMENTAL COURT SYSTEM, supra note 34, at I-11 n.*, citing C.A.
WRIGHT, LAv OF FEDERAL COURTS 12 (2d ed. 1970); Carringtion, Crowded Dockets and the
Courts of Appeals, 82 HARV. L. REv. 542, 606-07 (1969).
1974]
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coupled with restraint on the part of the reviewer, requires a
generalist who can penetrate the scientific explanation underly-
ing a decision just enough to test its soundness. A specialist
whose attention was directed exclusively to environmental is-
sues would tend to intrude his own judgment on the issues,
thereby coopting the discretion of the agency.
37
2. The Cost of Judicial Review
Review by the courts to assure consideration of environmen-
tal factors has a cost, or at least a potential cost. In the case of the
litigation over Storm King,38 it is said that the cost of delay has
been brownouts in New York. It is also said the Alaskan Pipeline
controversy, which raged for three years in the courts3 9 only to
be settled by congressional action,40 may have extended the time
required to handle the energy shortage.
The courts are not without means of controlling the costs of
review. They have evolved equity doctrines concerning stays and
injunctions, for instance, that permit the different facets of
public interest to be taken into account in deciding whether an
injunction should issue. These rules enable courts to avoid inter-
ference on behalf of claims that are not likely to succeed and in
cases where the public interest against delay overbalances en-
vironmental considerations.4'
An extreme example of judicial restraint against enjoining
an activity on environmental grounds appears in the litigation
surrounding the underground nuclear test on Amchitka, code-
named Cannkin.42 Our court held that there were serious ques-
tions whether the environmental impact statement of the AEC
complied with the law, but we denied the injunction in view of
the Government's "assertions of potential harm to national se-
curity and foreign policy-assertions which we obviously cannot
appraise. ' 43 The asserted consequences of delay prompted ex-
3 7 Cf Rifkind, A Special Court for Patent Litigation? The Danger of a SpecializedJudiciary,
37 A.B.A.J. 425 (1951).
38 Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v. FPC, 354 F.2d 608 (2d Cir. 1965), cert.
denied sub nom. Consolidated Edison Co. v. Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference, 384
U.S. 941 (1966); Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v. FPC, 453 F.2d 463 (2d Cir.
1971), cert. denied, 407 U.S. 926 (1972).
" Wilderness Soc'y v. Hickel, 325 F. Supp. 422 (D.D.C. 1970), rev'd sub nom.
Wilderness Soc'y v. Morton, 463 F.2d 1261 (D.C. Cir.), on remand, 4 BNA ENv. REP. CAS.
1467 (D.D.C. 1972), rev'd, id. at 1977 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 917 (1973).
40See Act of Nov. 16, 1973, P.L. 93-153, § 203(d), 87 Stat. 585.4 1 See Virginia Petroleum Jobbers Ass'n v. FPC, 259 F.2d 921 (D.C. Cir. 1958).
42 Committee for Nuclear Responsibility, Inc. v. Seaborg, 463 F.2d 783, 788, 796
(D.C. Cir.) (3 cases), affd sub nom. Committee for Nuclear Responsibility v. Schlesinger,
404 U.S. 917 (1971).
43 463 F.2d at 798. The Government was asserting, inter alia, that the delay could
jeopardize the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks.
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peditious judicial handling-first in our court on a series of
rulings had in a matter of weeks, and after our decision had
sorted out the issues, by a lightning review in the Supreme
Court, which in three days' time heard oral argument and
affirmed the denial of the injunction.
44
The cost of judicial review in NEPA cases cannot always be
reduced so dramatically, however, and it will probably never
approach a level of insignificance. Yet in determining the ulti-
mate utility of review, its costs must be balanced against its
contributions: in the case of NEPA, minimization of the en-
vironmental costs of ongoing governmental programs. In what
follows I will not attempt a comprehensive review of NEPA
litigation. This task has been performed elsewhere.45 I propose
instead to focus first on the broad tenor of judicial review under
NEPA and then specifically on the courts' handling of a few key
problems, all with an eye to possibilities for minimizing the
liabilities and maximizing the benefits which derive from the
courts' activities.
B. The Developing Judicial Role
1. Establishing the Tenor of Review
Section 102(2) of NEPA applies across the board to all
federal officials and agencies, to require an environmental im-
pact statement, a "detailed statement" of the impact of any
"major Federal action significantly affecting the quality of the
human environment .... 46 This requirement was fleshed out by
the D.C. Circuit in the historic Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Commit-
tee, Inc. v. AEC in 197 1,4 holding invalid Atomic Energy Com-
mission regulations that prohibited raising environmental issues
in certain proceedings. Calvert Cliffs' broadly declared that NEPA
compels agencies to take environmental values into account by
use of an "interdisciplinary approach," permitting a "balancing
process" in which environmental costs are weighed alongside
economic and technical benefits. Further, the court stated that
the "systematic" balancing analysis includes a high standard of
consideration of environmental factors, "a standard which must
be rigorously enforced by the reviewing courts. 48 And finally
Calvert Cliffs' went on to hold that the preparation and circula-
11 Committee for Nuclear Responsibility v. Schlesinger, 404 U.S. 917 (1971).45 F. ANDERSON, NEPA IN THE COURTS (1973).
4642 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(c) (1970).
47449 F.2d 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
48Id. at 1114.
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tion of the environmental impact statement can not be separated
out from the main line of decisionmaking, but must be fully
integrated into the decisionmaking process of the agency and its
hearing and rulemaking procedures.
The new student who comes to Calvert Cliffs' after having
read Overton Park may not fully capture its drama and
significance. Whereas the statutory provision construed in Over-
ton Park gives environmental values dominant significance under
certain circumstances, NEPA does not assign a relative weight to
environmental concerns and therefore leads the courts to recog-
nize much broader governmental discretion in deciding whether
or not those concerns should prevail in a given case. But NEPA
is a statute of incomparably greater scope. And it is the breadth
of NEPA that underscores the importance of the ruling in
Calvert Cliffs' that environmental factors must be given some
consideration in the balancing process that is the very stuff of
government, and in the contemplation of sufficient judicial re-
view to assure that this kind of consideration and balancing has
really taken place.
The counterpoise of Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v.
Morton49 (NRDC) added to Calvert Cliffs' tone of firmness in
judicial monitoring the recognition of the inevitable rule of
reason. NRDC held inadequate an environmental impact state-
ment filed by the Department of the Interior on its proposed sale
of offshore leases, because the statement declined to consider
the environmental consequences of alternative courses of action
available to other agencies of government. Despite this result,
NRDC has come to stand for principles of limitation on the
demands that may legitimately be drawn from NEPA. First, in
evaluating possible adverse environmental impact there is no
requirement of "crystal ball" inquiry. Second, in interpreting
NEPA's section 102 requirement of compliance "to the fullest
extent possible... ,"5 the courts must take into account "that
the resources of energy and research-and time-available to
meet the nation's needs are not infinite."' 5' As was stated in
NRDC, "if this requirement is not rubber, neither is it iron."5 2
Third, in the last analysis, NEPA is "subject to a construction of
reasonableness . . . -53 In NRDC, this meant examining alterna-
tives readily identifiable by the agency, but it excluded the need
49458 F.2d 827 (1972).
5042 U.S.C. § 4332 (1970).
51 458 F.2d at 837.
52Id.
53
1d.
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to discuss effects "deemed only remote and speculative
possibilities.
'54
NRDC does not undercut Calvert Cliffs' insistence that en-
vironmental consequences be given consideration. It rather en-
sures that such consideration will be provided in the context of a
viable decisionmaking process, a process not throttled with bur-
dens that are unproductive or counter-productive. The two
decisions in composite stand for the two sides of the coin of
judicial review-to ensure supervision of the agencies and to
refrain from excessive intrusion.
2. Handling of Key Problems Under NEPA
a. Review of the Threshold Determination that Section
102(2)(C) is Inapplicable
When section 102(2)(C) of NEPA applies, the issue arises of
the extent of judicial review of the impact statement that must be
filed. But when the issue is the applicability of section
102(2)(C)-whether the federal action is "major" and whether
it "significantly affects the quality of the human envi-
ronment"-there is court review of the threshold determina-
tion that no impact statement need be filed. The courts have
evolved a requirement that an agency which believes an impact
statement is unnecessary must give a statement of its reasons.
This gives assurance that the agency "understood the statutory
[NEPA] standard. In addition, it will provide a focal point for
judicial review of the agency's decision, giving the court the
benefit of the agency's expertise."55 The quality and extent of
judicial review may be examined by reference to the decisions of
two Second Circuit panels in Hanly v. Mitchell (Hanly I) and Hanly
v. Kleindeinst5 6 (Hanly II) and also of the D.C. Circuit in
Maryland-National Park and Capital Planning Commission v. United
States Postal Service.
57
The Hanly cases concerned the proposed construction of a
Metropolitan Correction Center as part of the Foley Square
Courthouse complex. The Government Services Administration
(GSA) decided it did not have to file an impact statement. In
Hanly I the court held that GSA had not taken a "hard look" at
54 Id. at 838. For further development of this point, see text accompanying notes
62-63 infra.
55 Scientists' Institute for Public Information, Inc. v. AEC, 481 F.2d 1079, 1095
(1973).
6 Hanly v. Mitchell, 460 F.2d 640 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 990 (1972); Hanly
v. Kleindienst, 471 F.2d 823 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 908 (1973).
57 No. 72-2126 (D.C. Cir., Aug. 23, 1973).
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the consequence of locating a jail across from two apartment
buildings. It noted possible effects on the "living environment"
of the families stemming from "riots and disturbances" that
could occur in the facility and also from increased traffic and
parking. It required GSA to develop a reviewab'e environmental
record, construing NEPA to protect "the quality of life for city
residents." On remand, GSA prepared a twenty-five-page "As-
sessment" and again concluded the jail would not significantly
affect the quality of human environment. The court concluded
the agency had not justified its noncompliance with NEPA since
it had failed to make a determination of environmental
significance in terms of two objective factors, which may be
characterized with some oversimplification as the new quality of
use, as departing from existing uses in the area, and the new
quantity of use. The court held that the agency's determination
was arbitrary and capricious and remanded for its consideration
anew whether an impact statement had to be filed.
Our recent decision in Maryland-National Park and Capital
Planning Commission opted for more depth and less breadth in
review of threshold determinations-particularly where local
zoning decisions can assure consideration of factors such as
aesthetics or social demographics. This suit was brought by the
Maryland-National Capital Park and Planning Commission to
enjoin continued construction by the United States Postal Service
of the Washington Bulk Mail Center in Prince George's County,
Maryland. In remanding the denial of a preliminary injunction
for further consideration the court held that the reviewing court
should particularly scrutinize a federal agency decision not to file
an environmental impact statement when such action results in a
deviation from local zoning procedures. Such deviation was a
signal to the court to look carefully at the decision not to file an
impact statement, but it was to restrict its consideration to such
environmental effects as pertain to the "hard core" values of
NEPA, the protection of natural resources and health.58
58 When local zoning regulations and procedures are followed in site location
decisions by the Federal Government, there is an assurance that such 'environ-
mental' effects as flow from the special uses of land-the safety of the structures,
cohesiveness of neighborhoods, population density, crime control, and
esthetics-will be no greater than demanded by the residents acting through
their elected representatives. There is room for the contention, and there may
even be a presumption, that such incremental impact on the environment as is
attributable to the particular land use proposed by the Federal agency is not
"significant," that the basic environmental impact from t~ie project derives from
the land use pattern, approved by local authorities, that prevails generally for
the same kind of land use by private persons.
When, on the other hand, the Federal Government exercises its sovereignty
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(i) The Scope of NEPA
Urban environment is not inherently outside the scope of
NEPA, although subjectively, perhaps, the legislators were think-
ing of natural resources, and of wilderness, or at least rural,
rather than urban environment. However, when the federal
action is only a single aspect of a broader problem of city land
use, and NEPA is seized upon by citizens because of what is
essentially a happenstance that a federal agency is involved in
one element of a broader problem, I become concerned that a
too wide-reaching construction of the scope of NEPA, or at least
of section 102(2)(C), may lead to a dilution of resources, both
executive and judicial, which in the last analysis will be counter-
productive in terms of assuring the primary goals of NEPA.
5 9
This possibility should be taken into account in interpreting the
intended reach of section 102(2)(C), whether one is concentrat-
ing on the requirement that an action be "major" or that it affect
"the quality of the human environment," which is the focus of
my remarks here, or that this aspect of its impact be "significant."
(ii) The Temper of Review
But when an agency action lies clearly within the reach of
section 102(2)(C), there is certainly merit in the concept underly-
ing the Hanly opinions that the courts cannot permit NEPA to be
undone by scanting review of threshold determinations. Thus, in
Maryland-National Planning Commission we were not prepared to
say that the GSA and the United States Postal Sevice had ade-
quately justified not writing an impact statement, regarding
problems of water runoff and oil spillage from vehicles. Judicial
review of such matters is not to be denied or tightly confined by
the doctrine of deference to executive officials. That deference is
appropriately generous under the rule of administrative law
when there is a technical matter within the special competence of
the official or agency. But when an essentially nonenvironmental
agency has made a determination downplaying the environmen-
tal consequences of its action, the court may cock a skeptical eye
so as to override local zoning protections, NEPA requires more careful
scrutiny ...
Not all deviations from local zoning will necessarily rise to the level of affecting
the 'quality of human environment' within the fair meaning of that term.
Id. at 10-12.
59 One may muse on whether the judicial construction of NEPA would be as broad if
the courts were subject to the requirements of the Act, an observation that suggests itself
by Chief justice Burger's request that Congress be required to file a judialal impact
statement before assigning any further duues to the court.
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and insist on the kind of justification that Overton Park seems to
contemplate.
60
(iii) Alternative Dispositions
In Hanly II, the role of the courts in determining the proper
scope of NEPA was addressed in terms of only one disposition,
whether the courts should require the agency to write an impact
statement. In Maryland-National Planning Commission we sug-
gested that the courts might play a more positive role in the
process, at least in a context where the agency decision had gone
too far to be halted completely while the court could come to
grips with the matter. Balancing the equities and taking into
account the overall public interest, the court concluded that even
in case of NEPA violation, of failure to file an impact statement,
the appropriate judicial response might not be a total prohibition
but a ruling withholding such an injunction upon the condition
that the agency make certain project modifications, such as
provision for impoundment of water on the roof of the postal
facility, which would significantly reduce environmental impact.
Indeed, where project modification can reduce environmental
impact to a minimum, an environmental impact statement is no
longer required. Thus the goal of NEPA may in some instances
be achieved as well or better by a change in design that
minimizes environmental impact and avoids controversy and
possible delay than by the exercise of writing an impact state-
ment. Presumably Congress envisioned amendments of a project
to curtail environmental impact in the light of an impact state-
ment. Modification in order to avoid an impact statement is a
sensible corollary.
b. Court Review of the Adequacy of Impact Statements
(i) Monitoring by the Court
It seems reasonable to predict that the courts will review
with increasing care the content of environmental impact state-
ments filed under section 102(2)(C) of NEPA. Although the role
of the federal courts in this capacity has not been authoritatively
determined by the Supreme Court, I venture to say that it will
0 The stringency with which courts have in fact tested agency threshold determina-
tions has been characterized by some as de novo review, F. ANDERSON, supra note 45 at
100-05, but as I have suggested here, it is perfectly explicable in terms of the supervisory
function by which courts, under the rule of administrative law, do not undertake to make
findings or take action on their own but simply act to ensure that the agency performs
these functions in a responsible way.
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not be limited to the mechanical assurance that the file contains a
document neatly tied up in ribbons and captioned "impact
statement." Inasmuch as NEPA's checklist of factors to be dealt
with in an impact statement does reflect a significant congres-
sional objective-to expand the very bases on which executive
decisions are to be made-the courts have a role in assuring at
the least a good faith agency effort to fulfill that objective.
More and more this is likely to mean close judicial scrutiny
of a document to see that it fully discloses and analyzes the
environmental impacts of a proposed action; that it lays bare
alternatives to the proposed action in such a way as they may be
understood and appreciated by the decisionmaker; and more
generally, in the vernacular, that it all hangs together and makes
elementary good sense. As in judicial review of threshold deter-
minations under section 102(2)(C), this scrutiny is not likely to be
marked by particular deference to the initiating agency to the
degree that it can claim no special expertise in isolating or
analyzing the environmental ramifications of its activities. 6 '
Of course, what must appear in an adequate impact state-
ment is subject to a rule of reason recognized by the courts. In
NRDC we held that section 102(2)(C) of NEPA required an
analysis of the environmental risks of alternatives to the leasing
of offshore oil fields including alternatives which were not within
the immediate power of the agency filing the impact statement to
implement, 62 such as the elimination of oil import quotas. At the
same time we said that only "reasonably available" alternatives
need be discussed and stated further that "the Court does not
seek to impose unreasonable extremes or to interject itself within
the area of discretion of the executive as to the choice of the
action to be taken. 63 We took this principle to foreclose the
necessity of including discussion of long-range alternatives, such
as the development of oil shale and coal liquefaction and
gasification, to what was essentially a proposal for short-term
relief from fuel shortages.
Just how the rule of reason might operate in other cases is
suggested by our decision in the Amchitka controversy. 64 There
we held that the agency could not rest content with its own view
of the impact of its actions but had to set forth opposing views as
61 See text accompanying note 60 supra.
62 458 F.2d at 834-36.
" Id. at 838 (footnote omitted).
14 Committee for Nuclear Responsibility, Inc. v. Seaborg, 463 F.2d 783, 788, 796
(D.C. Cir.) (3 cases), affd sub nom. Committee for Nuclear Responsibility v. Schlesinger,
404 U.S. 917 (1971).
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well. At the same time we entered the caveat that only "responsible
opposing views" were required to be expressed.6 5 This standard
means discretion, of course, as to what constitutes a "responsible
opposing view," and our decision in Amchitka has been ques-
tioned by students of NEPA on precisely that ground,66 but with
proper judicial supervision I think it keeps open the door to fair
appraisal by the agency, the President, Congress and the public
without requiring the agency to shoulder the burden of isolating
and cataloguing all views on a given issue regardless of their
plausibility.
(ii) Measuring the Effect of Judicial Supervision
The importance of the courts' work in reviewing the ade-
quacy of impact statements may be derided by saying that the
agency can always report and consider environmental factors
and then do what it wants in any event, with some rationaliza-
tion. The skeptics might point to the NRDC case. As the author
of that- opinion, I was much concerned about the delay oc-
casioned by our decision, which sustained an injunction against
Interior's oil and gas lease sales, for I believed that the energy
crisis, even then, was such that the leases would probably be sold
eventually, after amplification of the impact statement to include
the elimination of oil import quotas as an alternative course of
action. That hunch was, of course, borne out. The environmen-
tal groups did not even litigate the sale authorized after the
impact statement was modified.
But it misses the point of judicial review under section
102(2)(C) of NEPA to -focus on the impact which a court's
decision had in any particular case. The proper object of scrutiny
is the extent to which the activity of the courts has encouraged
agencies to modify their decisionmaking process in an effort to
avoid judicial restraints, and perhaps even more to the point, the
extent to which these process changes have affected agency
output.
From this point of view, despite the courts' ultimate defer-
ence to the executive, consistent and scrupulous enforcement of
the requirements of NEPA does not seem so much sound and
fury signifying nothing. In the Louisiana lease case, for instance,
we were advised that, in order to lessen environmental risk, the
acreage covered' by the proposed sale was reduced from what
65 463 F.2d at 787.
66 F. ANDERSON, supra note 45, at 210.
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was originally contemplated, by the withdrawal of eight tracts
closest to the Delta Migratory Waterfowl Refuge.6 7 Similarly, in
the last round of the Alaskan Pipeline case, 8 where a NEPA
question was argued but not decided by our court, litigation of
the conservation groups resulted in a modification of the project
in the interest of environmental concerns. The ultimate Interior
Department permit contained an express Environmental Stipula-
tion which required the permittees to bury certain stretches of
pipe whose exposure above ground would have adversely af-
fected the caribou herds and the native population dependent
thereon. Also the permittees were required to bury pipe in such
a way as to lessen the adverse effect on the permafrost. These
and other restrictions imposed by the Department of Interior as
conditions on the grant of rights-of-way for the pipeline were
expressly preserved in the legislation providing for immediate
construction of the line. 9 And some in Congress who supported
immediate construction did so because "the environmentalists
-through long delays they have already forced-achieved the
inclusion of strong safeguards in plans for the Alaskan line."
70
The NEPA process may result, on occasion, in the termina-
tion of projects. The termination of the Cross-Florida Barge
Canal project, 7I after crystallization of its effect on the Ever-
glades, comes to mind. The skeptic might, not unreasonably,
stress that opposition to this project also involved nonenviron-
mental factors, including the economic interests of the railroads.
c. Substantive Review of the Agency Decision
The function of the courts in reviewing an agency decision
to pursue its mission in the face of significant adverse environ-
mental impact awaits definitive resolution. Judge Friendly, for a
three-judge district court in review of an ICC action permitting
the Bush Terminal Railroad to abandon its New York Harbor
operations, offered the thought that in cases of good faith
compliance with NEPA procedures, "we seriously question
67 458 F.2d at 831.
68 Wilderness Soc'y v. Morton, 479 F.2d 842 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 917
(1973).
69 Act of Nov. 16, 1973, P.L. 93-153, § 203(c), 87 Stat. 585.
70 119 Cong. Rec. 13,574 (daily ed. July 16, 1973) (remarks of Senator Fannin).
71 Construction on the project was suspended by the President after litigation at the
district court level, Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Corps of Engineers, 324 F.
Supp. 878 (D.D.C. 1971), resulted in a preliminary injunction against the Corps. See In re
Cross-Florida Barge Canal Litigation, 329 F. Supp. 543 (Judicial Panel on Multidistrict
Litigation 1971).
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whether much remains for a reviewing court," since the agency
would have complied with the "hard look" mandate.7 2 In my
view, the "hard look" metaphor requires more than subjective
good faith, which would be essentially untestable; it requires an
analysis of the environmental consequences sufficient to convince
a court that they have been considered. It is noteworthy that
Judge Friendly did analyze in detail the ICC's findings, and its
reopening of the record on remand to comply with NEPA
procedures, and found they were supported by "substantial
evidence."
Recently there has surfaced a new approach to judicial
review, review not only of the statement but also of the substan-
tive decision to take executive action. This appears in Environ-
mental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Corps of Engineers,'73 which related to
the construction of the Gillham Dam on the Cossatot River in
Arkansas. The case had been litigated at length in the district
court, resulting in six lower court memorandum opinions over
one and one-half years.7 4 The NEPA statement had extensive
coverage of the effect on wildlife of the proposed dam and
otherwise showed a substantial effort on the part of the Corps. It
cost $250,000 to prepare, was 200 pages in length and contained
an appendix of 1500 pages.75 The court of appeals affirmed the
district court's ruling that this statement was adequate. The
court, however, disagreed with the district court's contention that
there was no room for substantive review of the decision
reached. Chief Judge Matthes stated that the "Act is more than
an environmental full disclosure law."7 6 The court relied on the
APA as providing judicial review; the APA's narrow exception
for action committed to agency discretion 77 was held inapplica-
ble, with reliance on a similar ruling in Overton Park that the
decision of the Secretary to construct the road was not within
such an exception.7 8 The Eighth Circuit held that NEPA re-
quired a good faith balancing of competing interests, and that
the action contemplated by the mission agency could be enjoined
when its balance was arbitrary.7 9 This was dictum perhaps be-
72 City of New York v. United States, 344 F. Supp. 929, 940 (E.D.N.Y. 1972).
71470 F.2d 289 (8th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1072 (1972).
7' 342 F. Supp. 1211 (E.D. Ark. 1972); 325 F. Supp. 749, 741 (E.D. Ark. 1971); 325
F. Supp. 737, 732, 730 (E.D. Ark. 1970).
"470 F.2d at 294.76 1d. F.2d at 297.
77 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2) (1970).78 See 401 U.S. at 410.
79 In reaching this result the Eighth Circuit relied principally on the following
language from Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Comm. v. AEC, 449 F.2d 1109, 1115 (D.C.
Cir. 1971) (emphasis added): "The reviewing courts probably cannot reverse a substan-
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cause the project was allowed to proceed, but it was a deliberate
approach. Other circuits have been less expansive. The Tenth
Circuit, in National Helium Corp. v. Morton,8 0 thought there was
no judicial review of the substantive decision. The Fourth Circuit
has also indicated that if an agency "makes a good faith judg-
ment as to the consequences, courts have no further role to
play.'
Conceptually there is much force to the Eighth Circuit
opinion. Speaking practically, it is difficult for courts to rebal-
ance on their own. Of course, common law courts were required
to balance the utility of the conduct against the gravity of the
harm in nuisance actions, but this was primarily in regard to
private activity, and the courts were to balance in the first
instance, performing a function that is now delegated to the
Government agexlcy.
Part of the difficulty is the subjective nature of the balancing
that is presented for review. There are broad references to
cost-benefit analysis in this area. While many of the benefits can
be quantified, avoiding property loss from flood control, for
example, or providing jobs, the environmental cost is typically
less amenable to quantified analysis. Reliance on cost-benefit
analysis is hindered further by questions, such as the appro-
priate discount rate, which have yet to be given definitive
resolution.
8 2
While the formula or standard for judicial review is not
without some significance, it stands on a lower plane than the
means and the disposition on the part of the court to retrace the
advantages and disadvantages of the action decision. If the
balance struck by the agency is within a zone of reasonableness,
though it is not the one the court would itself have preferred, it
will be sustained, and this is the traditional standard of adminis-
trative law. If the agency's decision, or even the decisional
approach, is considered by the court to be obtuse or purblind, to
be, in legal terms, outside the zone of reasonableness, the par-
ticular formula of judicial review will not be likely to preclude
judicial inhibition or remand.
tive decision on its merits, under Section 101, unless it be shown that the actual balance of
costs and benefits that was struck was arbitrary or clearly gave insufficient weight to
environmental values."
80455 F.2d 650 (10th Cir. 1971).
81 Ely v. Velde, 451 F.2d 1130, 1138 (4th Cir. 1971).
1
2 See McPhail v. Corps of Engineers, 4 BNA ENv. REP. GAS. 1908 (E.D. Mich. 1972).
But see Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 770 (1972) (holding as to the conditional
delegation of plenary congressional power to exclude aliens "that when the Executive
exercises this power negatively on the basis of a facially legitimate and bona fide reason"
the courts will not look behind the exercise of discretion).
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IV. COURT REVIEW OF REGULATORY ACTIONS
BY ENVIRONMENTAL AGENCIES
Court review of regulatory actions by environmental agen-
cies embraces the same rule of administrative law that the court,
usually the court of appeals, applies generally to government
agencies engaged in complex policy formulation. But there are
some aspects in which the special features of environmental law
seem to make a difference.
A. The Review of Inaction
The courts are somewhat readier to review inaction by
environmental agencies than by other agencies of Government.
The first case to reveal this tendency was Environmental Defense
Fund, Inc. v. Ruckelshaus, 83 where the court reversed a failure to
commence proceedings for the deregistration of the pesticide
DDT and remanded for findings to support the decision not to
suspend sale during the litigation, in view of the Administrator's
recognition that a "substantial question" existed as to the safety
of DDT.
A year later, the court decided Environmental Defense Fund,
Inc. v. EPA,84 remanding the failure to suspend aldrin and
dieldrin pesticides. Here, the court assumed the power to review
the findings for nonsuspension and remanded for lack of an
explanation by EPA of the benefits, if any, from continued use of
these products during the proceeding as against suspension or
partial suspension. "The interests at stake here are too important
to permit the decision to be sustained on the basis of speculative
inference as to what the Administrator's findings and conclusions
might have been regarding benefits. 8 5
In this opinion, the court stated that it was "impressed by
the thoughtfulness and range of EPA's general approach"
86
toward its "difficult and demanding" functions, but it insisted on
a "high standard of articulation" for this agency. "The impor-
tance and difficulty of subject matter entail special respon-
sibilities when the EPA undertakes to explain and defend its
actions in court. ' 87 Implicit in these remarks is the chief consid-
eration spurring the court to this relatively unusual review of
failure to suspend: the irreparable harm from environmental
83439 F.2d 584 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
84465 F.2d 528 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
85 Id. at 539.
6Id. at 540.
87 1d. at 541.
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inaction, the problem of irreversible consequences that is also the
underpinning of NEPA.
B. The Need for Consideration of Nonenvironmental
Aspects of the Public Interest
The cases on direct review of the validity of actions of en-
vironmental agencies, in terms of compliance with the require-
ments of the underlying statute, present the converse of the
NEPA-type cases. In the NEPA cases the courts are concerned to
assure that environmental consequences are considered. When
the action is taken by the environmental agency, those conse-
quences are likely to be clear. The dominant question for the
court becomes whether there has been sufficient consideration of
the nonenvironmental factors. In each case, the court assures
that there is a due consideration of all aspects of the public
interest, but the use of a different starting point gives a different
cast to the case.
This is most clearly developed in the opinion issued Feb-
ruary 10, 1973, in the automotive emission case, International
Harvester Co. v. Ruckelshaus.88 In that case EPA had failed to
exercise the statutory authority to suspend for one year the
emission standards that would otherwise be prescribed by the
statute for 1975 model cars. The court scanned such global
economic consequences as the impact on the overall economy if
EPA maintained an overly onerous requirement. There was also
the secondary issue of the effect on competition if the agency's
approach were to retain stringency for the record with the
intention of relaxing later as seemed necessary, an approach
which in this case would operate to penalize the most cooperative
and progressive of the manufacturers. This problem haunts any
approach which is not solidly based on current data and shows
that a planned relax-later policy presents its own evils of coun-
terproductive penalties. A systematic administrative course along
these lines would obviously inhibit genuine industry cooperation.
C. The Emergence of Technological Feasibility
as the Core Issue
In the Clean Air Act proceedings the issue of technical
feasibility has emerged as the core issue for decision. That issue
appears in the International Harvester decision on mobile sources
of pollution. The same question has been presented in cases
88 478 F.2d 615 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
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involving new stationary sources of pollution emissions.8 9 And it
promises to dominate litigation arising under the new Water
Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, which require pol-
luters to install the "best practicable control technology currently
available" 90 by 1977 and the "best available technology" 91 by
1983.
1. The Nature of the Feasibility Issue and the
Attitude of the Courts
The courts would be the first to agree, indeed to proclaim,
that they are not technicians and cannot themselves either decide
technological disputes, or draw on their own knowledge for a
ruling on whether an agency's determination is proper. 92 Thus,
in International Harvester we fully recognized that courts are
not equipped to second-guess whether, as a theoretical matter,
catalytic converters offered the "most effective" system for con-
trol of automobile emissions or to criticize that determination on
the basis that EPA misunderstood how such devices work.
93
A second and pivotal question in the case, however, drew a
slightly different response from the court: whether the catalytic
converter made feasible the achievement of auto emissions stan-
dards prescribed by Congress for 1975. The Administrator's
determination that the converter did offer a feasible control
technology was not based directly on the results of a scientific
test. In fact, the only emission performance data, offered by the
automobile manufacturers to show that achievement of the 1975
goals was not feasible, showed that no car equipped with the
device "had actually been driven 50,000 miles and achieved
9 See Portland Cement Ass'n v. Ruckelshaus, No. 72-1073 (D.C. Cir., June 29, 1973).
9033 U.S.C. § 1311(b)(1)(A)(i) (Supp. I 1972).
91 1d. § 1311(b)(2)(A).
92 In his opinion in NLRB v. Standard Oil Co., 138 F.2d 885 (2d Cir. 1943), Judge
Learned Hand expressed this limitation on the reach of judicial review:
That there can be issues of fact which courts would be altogether incompetent to
decide, is plain. If the question were, for example, as to the chemical reaction
between a number of elements, it would be idle to give power to a court to pass
upon whether there was 'substantial' evidence to support the decision of a board
of qualified chemists. The court might undertake to review their finding so far
as they had decided what reagents had actually been present in the experiment,
for that presumably would demand no specialized skill. But it would be obliged
to stop there, for it would not have the background which alone would enable it
to decide questions of chemistry; and indeed it could undertake to pass upon
them only at the cost of abandoning the accumulated store of experience upon
the subject.
Id. at 887. The decision in Standard Oil, in which the court declined to second guess the
NLRB's determination of the effect of employer coercion on the will of employees, seems
far removed from environmental concerns. But the underlying thinking is relevant to
environmental matters.
93478 F.2d at 647-48.
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conformity of emissions to the 1975 standards. 94 EPA's finding
was a prediction, based on a scientific methodology which was
nothing more itself really than a sophisticated method of proof.
With all deference to agency expertise, the court felt it should
address itself attentively to the problems which seemed to inhere
in EPA's methodology in assessing the reliability of the agency's
predictions. The court was convinced by its examination that
EPA had not established the reliability of the methodological
approach on which it relied.
Judge Bazelon's concurring opinion in the case suggested
that the majority's line of inquiry encroached upon the special
province of the agency.9 5 But to the extent that special knowl-
edge was involved, it was the knowledge of how matters are
proven, and that is a field in which courts have always had a
special interest and in which they cannot escape keeping up with
the scientific times. This brings to mind Justice Holmes'
aphorism that some requirements are not a duty but only a
necessity, for the courts and others concerned with justice. There
may be recondite problems in the frontier of statistical and
probability theory that a court cannot meaningfully handle.
Basically, however, a court can, by diligence and attentiveness,
address itself to issues of how matters are proven, even though
understanding such issues may involve some inkling of statistical
significance.
After International Harvester issued, I chanced to read again
the stimulating and prescient observation of Justice Frankfurter
concerning court review of technological prediction. In RCA v.
United States,9 6 RCA challenged the promulgation of standards
for color television, after the Commission had taken the position
that it was not necessary to wait for a system that was "compati-
ble" with existing black and white receivers and had chosen the
CBS system. Justice Black, writing for the majority, said that the
decision of the Commission should be sustained, considering
agency expertise, a thorough hearing process and a thorough
search of the record by the district court. Justice Frankfurter,
who thought the ruling of the court was based primarily on
deference to agency expertise, wrote, dubitante:
[W]e are told that the Commission's determination as to
the likely prospect of early attainment of compatibility is
a matter within its competence and not subject to court
9 4 Id. at 642.
95Id. at 650-51.
96 341 U.S. 412 (1951).
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review. But prophecy of technological feasibility is
hardly in the domain of expertness so long as scientific
and technological barriers do not make the prospect
fanciful. In any event, this Court is not without experi-
ence in understanding the nature of such complicated
issues. We have had occasion before to consider com-
plex scientific matters.
97
The Restatement formulation and the development of the
common law also demonstrate that the inquiry by the court into
the question of "feasibility," and the technical understanding
which that might require, is not new, generally, even if it inter-
jects a new note into court and agency relationships. This "feasi-
bility" concept was treated in the first Restatement98 as one of the
factors involved in judging the utility of conduct which, if of
large enough consequence, would preclude nuisance liability.
The Restatement provides that utility is determined, in part, on
the basis of "impracticability of preventing or avoiding the
invasion."
99
A leading federal case, relied on by Professor James in a
memorandum on the proposed formulation of Restatement
Second'00 and also by those drafting the first Restatement,101 is De
Blois v. Bowers.' 0 2 Plaintiff had sued to enjoin operation of a
factory which caused the discharge of obnoxious gases so as to
invade plaintiffs interests in the use and enjoyment of his land.
Justice Morton held that unless defendant took reasonable
measures to prevent the invasion, a mandatory injunction would
issue. He stated: "The question whether the defendants have
done everything reasonably practicable to avoid the cause of the
offense is important. Reasonable care must be used to prevent
annoyance .... ,,103 Framing the question in such a way inevita-
bly leads to an analysis of the technical question of whether
control technology exists,' 0 4 a task for which the judge in that
97 Id. at 426 (footnote omitted).
98 RESTATEMENT OF TORTS (1939).
99 1d. § 828(c).
100 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, App. A, at 143 n.9 (Tent. Draft No. 16,
1970).
101 See RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 7, at 84 (Tent. Draft No. 16, 1938).
10244 F.2d 621 (D. Mass. 1930).
103 Id. at 623.
104 In Vile v. Pennsylvania R.R., 246 Pa. 35, 91 A. 1049 (1914), the railroad
defendant was engaged in cleaning its locomotives with compressed air. "As a conse-
_quence of this process of cleaning, smoke, soot, ashes, cinders and greasy substances were
blown out of the stacks of the locomotives and settled on appellant's premises, ruining his
plants and vegetables and destroying his business." The trial court granted defendant's
motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, on the ground that the evidence
presented by plaintiffs expert on the ability of the defendant to control emission was
insufficient. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court reversed.
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case prepared himself by going to the scene of the pollution to
see for himself, noting the "galvanizing process" which was the
source of the fumes, and referring to the testimony of experts,
for both sides, on the concentration of the fumes as they reached
plaintiffs' land.
10 5
Our inquiry is complicated, of course, by the sophistication
that has been added over time in classifying pollutants and
designing emission controls. In pursuing the feasibility question
today, we face scientific issues that stretch courts' understanding.
Their difficulty even affects the court's ability to sense the heft of
a case, to determine, for example, which of the objections to the
agency's regulation or standard are serious and must be studied
in depth and which are essentially red herrings or in any event
are insubstantial. But this is not fundamental to the role of the
courts under statutes which put the assessment of technology at
the heart of the task of setting standards.
2. "Burden of Proof" as a Device for Testing
the Fairness and Sufficiency of
Presentations on Feasibility
It is important for my purpose to note that in the De Blois
case, the court's decision to issue an injunction did not rest on a
finding that there were in fact commercially practicable means
for controlling the fumes from the defendant's plant. The court
may well have felt uncomfortable in coming to a definitive
statement on the issue. Instead it simply identified the burden of
proof on the feasibility issue as resting with the defendant and
went on to determine that that burden had not been met, an
approach which called for significantly less conclusiveness on the
court's part.
The concept of the burden of proof is at the heart of our
handling of International Harvester. There we held that as the
automobile manufacturers' data established a case for the in-
feasibility of meeting the 1975 standards, the burden of proof
shifted to the Administrator in making out a case for his predic-
tions that the standards could be attained. We did not purport to
use "burden of proof" in the conventional sense of civil trials, but
simply to indicate that the Administrator must sustain the "bur-
Plaintiff's witness was a Naval Academy enineer-skilled in pollution control. He
testified that the damage would be avoided by using scrapers rather than blowers, and by
washing the smoke to remove injurious impurities. The court concluded plaintiff's expert
based his testimony on "actual experiments" and had shown pollution had been avoided
by measures used at "a phosphate plant in Camden."
10544 F.2d at 622-23.
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den of adducing a reasoned presentation supporting the reliabil-
ity of EPA's methodology."' 0 6 Our remand was based not on a
finding that the Administrator was in error in his finding of
feasibility but simply on our determination that the required
presentation had not been made. Judge Bazelon's concurrence
asserted that in this ruling the court was purporting to decide a
scientific issue.'0 7 In my view, the majority opinion cannot fairly
be so read; it was a burden of proof holding. It is my feeling that
the burden of proof concept will be relied upon increasingly in
review of similar questions by courts which are reluctant, on the
one hand, to interfere with an agency's expert manipulations of
test data and, on the other, to defer blindly to whatever
methodology the agency puts forth in support of its predictions.
The aptness of the burden of proof device in this context is
enhanced by the very reason for which predictive questions
appear so often in environmental regulatory cases. Predictions
are needed in the public interest, lest a more conservative and
deliberative study squander so much time as to generate irrever-
sible damage to the environment. In its reliance on prediction,
Congress balanced the risks of erroneous action against the risks
of delayed action. The firmer the predictions, of course, the
more fruitful this sort of approach will turn out to be. The
burden of proof and the burden of going forward are nothing
more nor less than devices for controlling risks of error. Their
deployment in feasibility review protects against excessive risks
of error that could seriously erode the efficiency of the regula-
tory scheme in which Congress has put such store.
D. The Effect of Agency Procedures
1. The Impact of Rulemaking
The questions put to the court are heightened in difficulty
by virtue of the informality of rulemaking procedures used at
the administrative level. When dozens if not hundreds of topics
are covered by the comments filed in response to proposed
rulemaking, there is no sifting at the agency level like that which
would occur if the subjects had to be shaped in terms of the
testimony of witnesses subject to cross-examination.
In turn, the agency does not identify in its statement of
reasons accompanying the rulemaking all of the manifold con-
106 478 F.2d at 643.107 Id. at 650-51.
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tentions made, with a specification of dispositions and agency
responses. The court responded to this problem in Kennecott
Copper Corp. v. EPA,' 08 by stating that although the APA does not
contain a general requirement for statement of reasons in
rulemaking, the minimum standard is not enough when there is
need to provide "aid of the judicial function, centralized in this
court, of expeditious disposition of challenges to standards."'10 9
The EPA modified its procedure, following Kennecott, to
supplement its statements of reasons accompanying other pro-
mulgations of standards under the Clean Air Act-as appears
from the statement of reasons provided in new stationary source
standards reviewed in Portland Cement Association v.
Ruckelshaus." 0 The number and variety of issues covered in
comments left a gap, however, which had to be covered on
remand.
2. Need for Additional Procedures in the Interest
of Fairness and Reasoned Decisionmaking
Courts may require supplemental procedures in rulemaking
over and above the APA minimum, particularly if matters of fact
are involved which are crucial to the problem. This was estab-
lished outside the environmental field in decisions such as Ameri-
can Airlines Co. v. CAB,' involving air freight regulations. The
American Airlines doctrine was followed in Holm v. Hardin,n 2 in
which the court remanded a regulation limiting the size of
imported tomatoes in order to give the importer an opportunity
to make a submission directly to the cognizant Department of
Agriculture official. Minimum rulemaking procedures would
have confined the importer's submission to an industry commit-
tee dominated by domestic producers. The principle was also
applied to EPA in International Harvester, where the court held
that although the sixty-day time limit for EPA's ruling on sus-
pension applications was justification for denying the kind of
general right of cross-examination that had been claimed by
Chrysler, a different question would be presented by "a claim of
a need for cross-examination of live witnesses on a subject of
critical importance which could not be adequately ventilated
under the general procedures."" 3 The opinion also went on to
108 462 F.2d 846 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
0 9 Id. at 850.
110486 F.2d 375, 379 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
1 359 F.2d 624 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 843 (1966).
112449 F.2d 1009, 1015 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
113 478 F.2d at 631.
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say "that a right of cross-examination, consistent with time limita-
tions, might well extend to particular cases of need, on critical
points where the general procedure proved inadequate to probe
'soft' and sensitive subjects and witnesses.""' 4 Our remand in that
case provided that cross-examination should be had on such
subjects, upon request, and also on new lines of testimony." 15
Judge Bazelon, concurring in the result, would have gone
further and announced a general right of cross-examination
throughout the proceeding." 6 He noted that granting this gen-
eral right might require abandonment of the sixty-day time limit
set by Congress, but he thought that it filled a greater need and
that the sixty-day time limit was something that lay within the
court's province to waive. In the absence of restraints in the
interest of fairness, which have an aura of both constitutional
requirement and implied legislative accord, I think a court has
no principled basis for overriding a clear-cut sixty-day mandate.
I am also of the view that cross-examination is a marvelous
technique in the right place, but if applied generally across the
board in administrative policy determinations, it can readily
become a drag. Or as stated in International Harvester, there is a
"not insignificant potential for havoc."' 1 7
A recent Fourth Circuit case, Appalachian Power Co. v.
EPA," 8 haseapplied the doctrine of American Airlines and Interna-
tional Harvester to the procedure for EPA approval of a state
implementation plan under section 110 of the Clean Air. Act
Amendments of 1970." 9 There had been state hearings on the
implementation plan, but at the federal level, when the plan was
approved, there had been neither hearings nor opportunity for
comment or testimony on the proposed state plans.
The court began with the proposition that the type of
procedures required were a function of the questions involved.
The core issue raised by petitioners was that the plan would have
the effect of closing their plants, or in the alternative, would
saddle them with quite large expenses. The court concluded that
petitioners' claims to a hearing would be satisfied if adequate
hearing procedures existed at the state level.' 20 This dovetailed,
in its opinion, with the need for expedition. The court stated,
114 Id.
115 Id. at 649.
'"Id. at 651-52.
'17Id. at 631.
118477 F.2d 495 (4th Cir. 1973).
11942 U.S.C. § 1857c-5 (1970).
120477 F.2d at 503-04.
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however, that it was the duty of EPA to consult those state
hearings, 2' and held the case pending the filing of the state
record and indication by EPA that it had consulted the state
hearings in reaching its decision to approve the state plan. This
authority to outline procedures, the court indicated, was pur-
suant to its judicial review function.
122
Agency procedures should be determined in the first in-
stance by the agency, choosing from among the various options
available to assure input for decision. The standard of judicial
review, the doctrine of the "hard look," however, must remain a
constant in the equation.
If the procedural minimum required by the APA is met, it
may be that judicial concern with the adequacy of an agency's
procedures could be satisfied by the course of remand used, for
example, in Kennecott Copper, in which the court was concerned
with the lack of findings even though no findings were required
by statute. 23 Under this approach, inadequate procedures, like
inadequate findings, would lead to a remand in aid of the
function of appellate review rather than a declaration that the
order as issued was invalid for inadequate procedures. Assuming
this tack did not result in manifest injustice to the parties, it
would have the advantage of avoiding any "penalty" to an agency
which had complied with prescribed statutory procedures. The
court's power to declare the regulation invalid for lack of fair
procedures would be reserved for the most flagrant cases. In the
ordinary case, the court would be remanding for further evi-
dence, a commonplace authority generally expressed in statutes
establishing judicial review of agency action. In International
Harvester the court made it clear that the order was not invalid
because of a procedural defect (failure to provide cross-
examination), but it remanded with instructions to the agency to
receive such evidence, in aid of the process of judicial review.124
It is notable that the International Harvester mandate ex-
pressly retained full flexibility on EPA's part to modify its order
in the light of the evidence received on remand. 2 5 This was an
acknowledgement of the concept of a partnership in the public
interest between the reviewing court and the agency being re-
12 11d. at 504 n.33.22 1Id. at 507.
123 See text accompanying notes 108-09 supra.
124 See 478 F.2d at 649. Similarly, in Portland Cement, the court remanded in part for
failure to respond to the assertions of an engineer that inaccuracies existed in the text
reports. This response might be in the nature of findings, and might require further
evidence at the agency level. 486 F.2d at 392-95.
12' See 478 F.2d at 650.
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viewed, both of which must be considered parts of the adminis-
trative process as a whole, with review combining effective
supervision, judicial restraint and administrative flexibility.
E. Standard of Judicial Review
There is no doubt that the scope of judicial review on the
merits is a narrow one, which must repose full latitude in the
agency, provided it has shown that it has taken a "hard look" at
the problems. It is not likely to be of great conseqhence whether
the formula is put in terms like the need for "substantial evi-
dence" or a "substantial inquiry" into whether the order was so
lacking in a reasoned basis as to be "arbitrary."' 26 My own habit
is to use the "substantial evidence" concept to define what is
needed to support evidentiary findings of fact, whether express
or implied, and to use the "arbitrary and capricious" term to
focus on the agency's transition from its facts to its ultimate
1
2 6 See Associated Industries v. Department of Labor, 487 F.2d 342 (2d Cir. 1973)
(comparing the "arbitrary and capricious" standard for review of rulemaking, 5 U.S.C.
§ 706(2)(A) (1970), and the "substantial evidence" test set in the Occupational Safety and
Health Act, 29 U.S.C. § 660(a) (1970)). Judge Friendly commented that "in the review of
rules of general applicability made after notice and comment rulemaking, the two criteria
do tend to converge." Id. at 350.
The District of Columbia Circuit recently ruled that when Congress provides a
"substantial evidence" test for direct circuit court of appeals review of rulemakin, there
is an implication that some kind of "record" is required-at least to the extent that the
agency cannot rely on material in another proceeding without giving the parties notice
and an opportunity to offer rebuttal material. See Texas Gulf Coast Natural Area Rate
Cases, No. 71-1828, at 49-50 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 24, 1973), petition for cert. filed, 42 USLW
3427 (U.S. Dec. 21, 1973) (nos. 73-966 to 968); Mobil Oi Corp. v. FPC, 483 F.2d 1238,
1258-60 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. granted sub nom. Chevron Oil Co. v. FPC, 42 U.S.L.W. 3401
(U.S. Jan. 14, 1974) (No. 73-91). Of course, these cases involved natural gas pricing
under the Natural Gas Act. In another context, the "record" might reasonably consist of
comments supplied by notice-and-comment rulemaking, provided there was opportunity
to supplement that procedure as needed for fair exploration of the underlying issues. See
International Harvester Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 478 F.2d 615 (D.C. Cir. 1973). Anyone
wishing to come finally to grips with whether and to what extent a statutory provision for
"substantial evidence' review implies an agency procedure, however, must face
inharmonious decisions on these issues. Compare Bunny Bear, Inc. v. Peterson, 473 F.2d
1002, 1005-06 & n.3 (1st Cir. 1973), with Chrysler Corp. v. Deartment of
Transportation, 472 F.2d 659, 667-71 (6th Cir. 1972); compare Superior Oil Co. v. FPC,
322 F.2d 601 (9th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 922 (1964), with City of Chicago v.
FPC, 458 F.2d 731, 738-45 (D.C. Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1074 (1972).
The procedural approach of the D.C. Circuit in the FPC cases may reflect a special
concern over the propriety of the FPC's conversion of ratemaking under the Natural Gas
Act into APA rulemaking, unless special care is taken to maintain a meaningful proce-
dure for the disputed issues which the FPC previously explored in an adjudicative
context. Cf Dakin, Ratemaking as Rulemaking-TheNew Approach at the FPC, 1973 DuKE L.J.
41, 78-87. Arguably the D.C. Circuit's approach is contrary to that in Phillips Petroleum
Corp. v. FPC, 475 F.2d 842, (10th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 42 U.S.L.W. 3401 (U.S. Jan. 14,
1974), and in the Southern Louisiana area case, Placid Oil Co. v. FPC, 483 F.2d 880 (5th
Cir. 1973), cert. granted, 42 U.S.L.W. 3405 (U.S. Jan. 14, 1974) (Nos. 73-437, 457, 464).
The Supreme Court denied certiorari in the Phillips case, perhaps because that petition
involved a serious issue of ripeness, since the FPC had not translated the Rocky Mountain
area decision into specific applications to the companies in the area. Since the Court is
aware of the Texas Gulf Coast opinion, it may indude some comment on this procedural
issue when it comes to decide tile substantive issue in Chevron Oil Co. v. FPC, No. 73-91
(U.S. Jan. 14, 1974).
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conclusions. 127 In any event, the court will not be confined to
bare formalities but will probe the entire record to identify the
choices made by the agency, to determine whether there has
been a disregard of ascertainable legislative intent, to assure itself
that the parties were offered a reasonable opportunity to present
their position, and to find whether there has been a reasonable
assessment of the interrelated policy and legal questions. The
court's careful scrutiny of whether an environmental agency has
given adequate consideration to nonenvironmental matters
stands in high relief by contrast with its concurrent willingness to
accept the agency's consideration of environmental matters as
complying with NEPA (as a "functional equivalent of a NEPA
impact statement") even though not put in the strict mold of an
environmental impact statement.1
2 8
In the present context, however, when technological feasibil-
ity questions have signal importance, it is probable that the
courts will continue to have recourse to burden of proof con-
cepts, which permit consideration of fairness alongside compara-
tive risks of error. The use of this approach in International
Harvester was not an accident but was responsive to an inherent
characteristic of this kind of litigation, in which so much is and
must be projected from the known to the forecast.
V. PROBLEMS AND POSSIBILITIES IN THE REVIEW
OF ENVIRONMENTAL AGENCIES
Perhaps the ultimate question in this portion of my inquiry
should be whether there should be judicial review of decisions by
environmental agencies at all. I have discussed the costs of
judicial review of attacks on executive decisions under NEPA.
129
Review by the courts of determinations by environmental reg-
ulatory agencies can also mean costly delays, although it does not
potentially affect nearly so many different governmental pro-
grams and operations as review under NEPA. Perhaps a more
important strike against judicial review stems from the level of
technological complexity in issues raised on appeal from deci-
sions of the Administrator of EPA, a level of complexity
significantly higher than in most NEPA cases. For NEPA is
designed to provide information to decisionmakers not versed in
12 7 See Greater Boston Television Corp. v. FCC, 444 F.2d 841, 850 (D.C. Cir. 1970),
cert. denied, 403 U.S. 923 (1971).
128 Portland Cement Ass'n v. Ruckelshaus, 486 F.2d 375, 384 (1973); see also En-
vironmental Defense Fund v. EPA [Coahoma Chem. Co] 489 F.2d 1247, 1254-56 (D.C.
Cir. 1973).'9 Text accompanying notes 38-44 supra.
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environmental technologies and therefore necessarily involves a
level of treatment accessible to the layman, whereas EPA func-
tions as a specialist agency in the resolution of often controversial
and technical points of environmental engineering. The ability
of federal judges without specialist training to competently probe
the record on appeal from a decision by EPA or similar agency
may therefore be very much in doubt.
Of course, there is some need for appeals from decisions of
such agencies to ensure balance and fairness. There are a range
of alternative forums, including Congress. Yet the members of
Congress have not undertaken review of manifold individual
decisions, nor have they created a special appeals commission for
that purpose.'30 Perhaps, then, to the extent that the federal
courts of appeal have in fact been given primary review respon-
sibilities in this context, the more fruitful line of inquiry is not
whether there should be judicial review but whether and in what
ways the costs of that review can be reduced and the proficiency
of appellate judges in their task increased.
A. Cutting Costs
Lloyd Cutler's recent remarks 131 on the overjudicialization
of environmental decisionmaking state a preference for a
modified decisional model. He believes the current combination
of mandated procedures and judicial review in the regulatory
context is partly responsible for our dirty air and our energy
crisis. His solution, along the lines of the Clean Air Act, is to set a
time limit for agency action, and further, a time limit for judicial
review, with all decisions done by rulemaking. 32 The possibility
of legislative time constraints for reviewing courts may merit
further consideration.
There are a growing number of instances in which impor-
tant issues have been addressed by the courts with reasonable
focus notwithstanding extraordinary expedition. 33 But max-
130 Congress has considered the establishment of "a separate court, or court system,
having jurisdiction over environmental matters .. " 33 U.S.C.A. § 1361n (Supp. 1973).
But the "investigation and study" which it commissioned on the issue came out opposed
to the creation of such an institution. See Kiechel, Environmental Court Vel Non, 3 ENv. L.
RFP. 50013, 50015-16 (1973).. 131 Heyman, Quarles, Sive & Cutler, The Challenge of Environmental Controls, 28 Bus.
LAw 9 (1973) (Special Issue).
'
32 Id.22-28.
133 See, e.g., New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971), rev'g 444
F.2d 544 (2d Cir. 1971), & af.,g United States v. Washington Post Co., 446 F.2d 1327
(D.C. Cir. 1971); Committee or Nuclear Responsibility v. Seaborg, 463 F.2d 796 (D.C.
Cir. 1971), affd sub nom. Committee for Nuclear Responsibility v. Schlesinger, 404 U.S.
917 (1971).
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imum expedition in any volume of cases may require dispensing
with reasons and the binding force of precedent, as Congress has
recognized. 134 If it is the role of a reviewing court to carry out an
attentive analysis and to provide explanatory reasons, expedition
may thus largely defeat the purpose of review. Perhaps an even
more important point to be made about expedition is that the
savings promised by time contraints may well turn out to be
illusory. A large number of environmental cases in our circuit in
recent years have been given a right of way over other matters in
actual practice, with expedition in decision, only to result in
remands which of necessity extend the time for ultimate de-
cisionmaking. This was the case in International Harvester.
One is left with the feeling that if judicial review of en-
vironmental regulatory decisions is worthwhile, it is worth the
delay attendant on a careful and reasoned consideration by the
reviewing court. The fact that our system of checks and balances
involves delay does not mean that it is inefficient. By ensuring
fairness and consistency, in a broad sense, with congressional
priorities, the corrective mechanism may enhance the efficiency
of resource allocations on a larger scale.
B. Proficiency
1. Review by a Single Judge, or an Appellate Panel
To the extent that there is judicial review of environmental
decisions, should it be by a single judge or by an appellate panel?
A single judge has more latitude in conducting an evidentiary
inquiry. If the administrative record requires testing or supple-
menting, he can hear witnesses. He can call expert witnesses to
help him understand what is in the record and can usually be
confident of a means of payment for experts.135 There is no
tradition of a short, set time for presentation, and he can
schedule whatever time is needed for a thoroughgoing inquiry.
An appellate tribunal permits some difference in focus
among the judges, which often and perhaps typically enhances
134 See, e.g., D.C. CODE § 23-104(d)-(e) (1973). These statutes provide for limited
appeal by the government of rulings made before or during trial. In order to expedite
the appeal, oral argument must be within 48 hours in cases where the trial has been
adjourned, and the decision must come within 48 hours of the argument. The appellate
court may dispense with the issuance of a written opinion. In United States v. Zeiger, 475
F.2d 1280 (D.C. Cir. 1972), the court heard an interim appeal brought under § 23-104(d)
and reversed a lower court decision admitting as evidence the results of polygraph
testing. In taking this step, the court declined to overrule precedent requiring exclusion
but expressly reserved the issue for consideration on appeal from the conviction, if any.
135 See text accompanying note 151-53 infra.
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depth perspective, as with a stereopticon. Different judges have
different strengths and backgrounds, and these implement the
purpose of judicial review by ensuring that the various facets of
the public interest have been given due consideration. The
collegial process of interchange and discussion is helpful even
though, in most cases, the laboring oar must be assigned to a
designated judge. And if the single judge is to be subject to
appellate review, the direct review of the agency by an appellate
tribunal saves time ultimately.
As a practical matter within the federal system, of course,
whether or not initial review will be had by a single judge or a
panel depends on whether or not first appeal from an adminis-
trative decision lies to the district court or the court of appeals.
What follows will suggest the relative merits of initial access to
one or the other forum in various kinds of cases.
a. Appeals to the District Courts
In the absence of statutory provisions for direct appeal to
the circuit courts, federal administrative decisions affecting the
environment may be brought in federal district court under the
Mandamus and Venue Act of 1962.136 Placing the initial forum
in the district court allows a thoroughgoing inquiry into the bases
of decision, such as occurred in Overton Park. Although officials
may file affidavits, they can be queried on interrogatories, and at
least in the absence of findings, the court may permit oral
depositions. In many cases these devices function to provide a
record without which appellate review, at least within its current
confines, would be largely ineffective.
137
b. Appeals to the Circuit Courts
(i) Appeals from Orders
In the case of licensing decisions made after a hearing,
Congress typically provides for review in the court of appeals.
This scheme operates, for example, in the context of a
17egistrant's challenge to a decision by EPA to cancel permission
to make or sell or use a pesticide. 38 It also applies to NEPA
challenges to FPC and AEC licensing proceedings. 139 Skipping
the district courts in these cases seems appropriate to the degree
136 28 U.S.C. § 1361, 1391 (1970).
137 Cf. Quaker Action Group v. Hickel, 139 U.S. App. D.C. 1, 3, 429 F.2d 185, 187
(1970).
1387 U.S.C. § 135b(d) (1970.
3D See 16 U.S.C. § 8251 (1970) (appeals from orders of FPC); 28 U.S.C. § 2342(4)
(1970) (appeals from orders of AEC).
ENVIRONMENTAL DECISIONMAKING
that agency adjudications produce a reasonably well-focused and
complete factual record with which an appellate court can com-
fortably deal-provided, of course, that the appellate tribunal
has access to sufficient scientific expertise to enable it to under-
stand the record, an issue with which I will deal subsequently.
140
(ii) Appeals from Agency Rulemaking
Similarly, with regard to agency determinations after
rulemaking procedures, Congress has, in the case of the chief
environmental regulatory agency, EPA, provided for review in
the court of appeals, again to avoid the delay incident to consid-
eration by two courts. Though the statutes do not expressly
require priority in the court of appeals, that intention is implicit
in the structure of the appeal, particularly where, as in the Clean
Air Act Amendments of 1970, the EPA has been put under
severe time constraints. A different pattern applies, however, to
NEPA attacks on regulations issued by other executive depart-
ments. In that case, there is often no process for appeal directly
to the court of appeals, and the lawsuits are often heard in the
district court.
Provision for direct appeal to the court of appeals from a
diffuse rulemaking record presents strains. Already the appellate
courts have had to devise procedures to implement their task of
review, and if they are to continue to act as the initial forum in
such cases, they may have to make further adjustments in their
conventional practices. In what follows I will suggest in some
detail the forms which such adjustments might take.
2. Flexibility in Appellate Procedures
Appellate tribunals will, inevitably, be obliged to develop
greater flexibility in the handling of these major environmental
cases. Today, they supplement their technical inadequacies only
by asking for supplemental memoranda and argument and by
remanding to the agency for additional findings, either on the
record as made or as supplemented by additional evidence.
a. Use of Counsel
It is, as I have said elsewhere, the lawyer's responsibility to
"elucidate the technical.'1 4 1 But it may be that the appellate
courts should become freer in calling on counsel for supplemen-
140 See text accompanying notes 142, 163-71 infra.
141 Leventhal, Cues and Compasses for Administrative Lauyers, 20 AD. L. REv. 237, 241
(1968).
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tal help. Our court is increasingly asking for supplemental
memoranda, sometimes using the informal practice of drafting a
letter for the clerk to send. Why not go further and be more
liberal in asking for supplemental argument in the light of such
questions?
There is awkwardness in reconvening the panel and counsel,
and the time involved seems forbidding. Yet the time required
for the judge to grind away on the basis of the original argu-
ment, even with the assistance of diligent law clerks, may mean
even greater delay in decision. Further, why not permit a single
judge to have an on-the-record conference without reconvening
the entire panel if the other members do not feel the need of
participating? Counsel will doubtless conclude that the initiating
judge is writing, but who is to know whether he is writing for the
majority or in dissent? It is primarily convention that makes an
appellate panel less flexible in such matters than a single trial
judge; appellate judges can and should become less custom-
bound.
b. Proposed Opinions
The flexibility of appellate courts and procedure might
include the use-if experts were called upon for assistance in
understanding the record-of a proposed opinion. This opinion
would be issued for the purpose of obtaining comment on
whether the court's view reflected misapprehension of a techni-
cally complex or ambiguous record. Although every opinion is
subject to reconsideration, courts may be more ready to entertain
comments leveled at a proposed opinion. The "proposed" deci-
sion technique is recognized by the APA for executive officials
and administrative agencies. Similarly, under the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure a master may file a draft report "for the
purpose of receiving [the parties'] suggestions.' 142 If the idea has
merit, it should not be foreclosed to the courts merely because
judicial application is novel.
3. Scientific Aides for Courts
Perhaps the path of vision lies in embracing the use by
courts of scientific experts of their own selection. International
Harvester commented that the courts have no scientific aides.
43
Yet this condition is not graven in stone. Let us begin by focusing
142 FED. R. Civ. P. 53(e)(5).
143 478 F.2d at 641.
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on the problem as it may surface when trial courts are the forum
for judicial review.
a. Trial Courts
(i) Expert Witnesses
Professor McCormick has pointed out, "Cases are recorded
as early as the 14th century-before witnesses were heard by
juries-of the summoning of experts by the judges to aid them
in the determining of scientific issues. The existence of the
judge's power to call witnesses generally and expert witnesses
particularly seems fairly well recognized in this country."'144 The
practice persists, even though it has been abandoned in England
in civil cases, 14 5 and would be codified by the Proposed Federal
Rules of Evidence.
146
As Wigmore forcefully develops, what may rightly disturb
the trial judge is that the partisanship and pecuniary subser-
viency of an expert witness called by a party, a problem encoun-
tered, of course, with ordinary witnesses as well, may distort the
perceptions of the trier of fact who associates scientists with
ideals of objectivity, trustworthiness and truth. The frequent
inconclusiveness, uncertainty and contradiction of expert tes-
timony may be as much a function of bias and selectivity on the
part of the witness, conscious or otherwise, as a reflection of the
limits of knowledge.' 47 A judge may rightly not wish himself or a
jury to be confined to a view of the issues shaped by such
testimony. Wigmore is quick to add, however, that the calling of
a scientific expert by the court should take place in the context of
evidence presented by experts representing parties, and that the
expert called should be subject to cross-examination, a stricture
which also appears in proposed rule 614(a).
The question whether the formalities of testimony for the
record should always accompany the input of court-appointed
experts was thrown into relief by an incident arising in 1963 in
the FPC's famous Permian Basin Natural Gas Area
Proceeding. 48 When the hearing examiner asked for help in
"filling a gap" in the evidence, it developed that a thoughtful
144 McCormick, Some Observations upon the Opinion Rule and Expert Testimony, 23 TEx.
L. REv. 109, 131 (1945).
145 S. PHIPsoN, EVIDENCE 1562 (1lth ed. 1970) (such witnesses can, in a civil case,
only with the consent of all parties).
146 Proposed Fed. R. Evid. 614(a), 56 F.R.D. 183, 279.
147J. WIGMoRE, EVIDENCE § 563 (3d ed. 1940).
14 See Leventhal, Reviewing the Permian Basin Area Gas Price Hearings, 73 PuB. UTIL.
FORT. 19, 25 (March 12, 1964).
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person in the industry was willing to come as a witness if called
by the hearing examiner but not by the parties. 149 The examiner
decided to interview the witness first, to explore the subject he
might be willing to discuss, but did so in an on-the-record session
expressly designed not to constitute testimony. While one party
sought unsuccessfully to stop this procedure by interlocutory
appeals that were dismissed, it was not made a ground for
objection to the ensuing regulation.
This episode, of course, may be distinguished from the
situation contemplated by Wigmore and proposed rule 614(a) in
that the expert was not functioning as a witness at the time of his
communications with the examiner. One could quibble about
where exactly the line defining a witness should be drawn for
this purpose. But certainly to require that all contacts, of what-
ever nature, between judges and neutral experts touching on
issues under review be subject to cross-examination by the par-
ties would seriously impair the flexibility of trial courts in il-
luminating the problems before them.' 50
Use of court-appointed experts inevitably raises the question
of who should pay for their services. For criminal cases in the
federal courts, the means of paying witnesses called by the court
is expressly provided by the Federal Rules of Criminal Proce-
dure. "The court may determine the reasonable compensation of
such a witness and direct its payment out of funds as may be
provided by law."' 51 The Administrative Office of the Courts has
a special account to pay for such witnesses.
There is no similar provision for civil cases. Justice Brandeis,
writing in Ex parte Peterson,152 felt there was a power in the
courts to tax the costs against the defeated party, but he also
cited Whipple v. Cumberland Cotton Manufacturing Co.' 53 as prece-
dent for the assessment of costs against both parties. There is
also the possibility that the court might bear the costs.
. A recent opinion of the Comptroller General' 5 4 dealt with
this last alternative in a case in which Judge Edward Curran
called a psychiatrist in a proceeding to determine whether a
person committed to a mental hospital, after successfully raising
14
9 Id.
150 For a proposed use of experts as appellate court aides, a capacity in which they
would not be subject to cross-examination, see text following note 165 infra.
'5 FED. R. GRIM. P. 28.
152 253 U.S. 300, 315-19 (1920).
153 29 F. Cas. 934 (No. 17,516) (C.C.D. Me. 1843).
154 52 Comp. Gen. 621-24 (1973).
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the insanity defense in a criminal trial, should be released upon
the motion of the hospital superintendant. 155 Judge Curran was
required by the statute in effect to make an independent assess-
ment whether the committee's condition warranted his release,
despite favorable testimony from the hospital.
Judge Curran referred the psychiatrist's invoice for payment
under the Criminal Justice Act.' 56 The bill was not paid by the
Administrative Office on the ground that habeas corpus pro-
ceedings were civil in nature. The Comptroller General, however
ruled that there was "no question concerning the authority of a
court to procure at its own motion expert services which are
deemed necessary to determine the matter before it,' 157 and that
the expense should be payable by the Administrative Office from
funds appropriated for "'miscellaneous expenses, not otherwise
provided for, incurred by the judiciary. . ..
(ii) Masters
Apart from expert witnesses, the courts may call on experts
in the role of masters. 159 The term "master" includes a "referee,
an auditor, an examiner, a commissioner, an assessor," which
broadly defined could include "scientific examiners." The adap-
tability of the procedure is highlighted by the case of Knight v.
Board of Education,160 where the court appointed a "Masters
Committee of Educational Experts" to supervise the implementa-
tion of an injunction against the board to provide high school
education to students whose transfer from a school had
amounted to a de facto discharge from the educational system.
The defendant board was to be taxed with the costs.'
6'
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide that "[t]he
compensation to be allowed to a master shall be fixed by the
court, and shall be charged upon such of the parties or paid out
of any fund or subject matter of the action, which is in the
custody and control of the court as the court may direct."'
62
Presumably the court also retains discretion in certain cases to
absorb the costs of a master itself, as in the psychiatrist-witness
case just discussed.
155 This motion can be brought under D.C. CODE § 24-301(e) (1973).
156 18 U.S.C. § 3006A (1970).
157 52 Comp. Gen. 621, 623 (1973).
138 Id.
159 FED. R. Civ. P. 53.
16048 F.R.D. 115 (E.D.N.Y. 1969).
'6 1 1d. at 118.
62 FED. R. Civ. P. 53(a).
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b. Appellate Courts: A New Role for Scientfic Experts in Appellate
Review
Could these available procedures be adapted to the need of
appellate courts for scientific aides? The principles of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure concerning masters have been applied
by analogy, as representing sound principles of judicial adminis-
tration, to masters appointed by the federal courts of appeals,
including masters appointed from personnel unconnected with
the court. 163 The usefulness of this device to appellate courts has
seemed limited to special circumstances, 164 however. And I know
of no examples of witnesses called by the appellate court, though
on occasion we question counsel as to matters outside the techni-
cal record and can accept their observations as a premise of
judgment if not contested.
165
(i) A Proposal,
What an appellate court needs, in my view, is an aide who is
not a witness so much as a kind of hybrid between a master and a
scientific law clerk, a scientific expert who might be available, at
the call of the appellate court, not to give evidence or resolve
factual or technical issues, but to advise a court so that it could
better understand the record. To illustrate: in the context of
appeals from EPA rulemaking proceedings, the expert could
help the court understand and appraise the relative significance
of petitioners' scientific contentions. He could also provide assis-
tance in understanding problems of scientific methodology and
in assessing the reliability of tests conducted by the agency in
light of specific criticisms. These are issues on which the expert
would assist the judge in performing a task he must now per-
form with only the help of a law-trained clerk.
166
163 This has occurred in cases where the appellate court has been called on by the
National Labor Relations Board to adjudicate an employer as in civil contempt of the
court's judgment affirming the Board's order. E.g., NLRB v. Crown Laundry & Dry
Cleaners, Inc., 437 F.2d 290, 292 (5th Cir. 1971); NLRB v. Ralph Printing & Lithograph-
ing Co., 433 F.2d 1058, 1060 (8th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 925 (1971); Skyine
Homes, Inc. v. NLRB, 381 F.2d 706, 707 n.4 (5th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1039
(1968).
1
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See note 163 supra.
165 Compare United States v. Kearney, 420 F.2d 170, 173 n.4 (D.C. Cir. 1969), with
Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 420 (1964).
166 See International Harvester Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 478 F.2d 615, 641 (D.C. Cir.
1973):
The legal issues are intermeshed with technical matters, and as yet judges have
no scientific aids. Our diffidence is rooted in the underlying technical complex-
ities, and remains even when we take into account that ours is judicial review,
and not a technical or policy redetermination . ...
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Of course, counsel are often helpful in elucidating a techni-
cally complex record, and I have suggested ways in which an
appellate court could be more flexible in making use of their
knowledge. 167 But surprisingly often in argument before a court
that enjoys the services of an excellent bar, the judges' questions
on technical matters are fended off rather than answered, even
after whispered conferences with the assistant nearby. And then
there are the agonies of the judge who feels after listening to
counsel that he understands the technical aspects well
enough-that is, well enough to ponder the legal issues-but
who finds when he comes to conference that he doesn't really
understand the matter that well, or perhaps does not remember
it clearly.'
68
A lawyer understanding a technical litigation knows very
well that a major part of his learning process is the acquisition of
background technical understanding-before he gets to focus on
the disputed issues. He spends many and often weary hours
discussing this learning with experts in whom he has confidence.
The need of the appellate court is not as broad-ranging, but it is
substantial, and it is often crucial.
(ii) Procedural Safeguards Required by the Use of Scientific
Aides
The question will doubtless arise whether the parties could
demand the right to be apprised of the advice given by the
court's scientific aide and to examine him. As I have implied by
stressing the analogy to the function of a law clerk, I think this
should not be a matter of right. If such a procedure were made
universally applicable to the expert's memoranda, why not to his
conferences with the judge? The resulting overload of procedure
would so inhibit the assistance as to leave the proposal stillborn.
Judges would have to be sensitive to the problem of advice
regarding scientific material that is not in the technical record.
Judges now refer to such material as a matter of judicial notice.
An appellate court would have to be vigilant in order to
sense whether the submission involved any matter that might be
disputed. The court could even hold an inquiry on whether
after-supplied material needed to enhance the court's under-
standing did in fact fall within an area of dispute. If an area of
possible dispute were involved, then there would be basis for a
167 Text following note 141 supra.
168See Leventhal, sura note 141.
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claim that material not offered by the expert should also be
brought forward for the court's consideration. Whether there
should also be cross-examination of the expert is another issue.
The common sense of the matter is that if the subject is one that
involves bona fide dispute, it is not a matter that the court should
handle by an appellate analogy to judicial notice or summary
judgment, and the case should be remanded to the agency to
take further evidence and findings. The failure of the courts to
be sensitive to this problem could result in Supreme Court
chastisement or perhaps in a reconsideration of the fundamental
wisdom of a court-aide scheme.
(iii) Practical Problems in the Use of Aides
If the course I am suggesting were taken, courts would be
faced with the problem of selecting satisfactory aides. The expert
could be drawn from the scientific community at large or from a
pool of scientific aides established for exclusive use of the courts.
The first alternative may be preferable, because inclusion in a
pool of "court aides" would not be attractive to the broad-gauged
and widely informed person who could best be expected to
provide the sort of information needed to assist the court in its
understanding. Choosing this alternative would not preclude
relying on institutions such as the National Academy of
Sciences-unless, of course, in that particular case they had
already given advice to the agency that was party to the litiga-
tions.
Payment would have to be arranged. My own predisposition
is that the costs would ordinarily be taxable to both parties, since
the expert's time is being used to inform the court on the points
made by both sides. In the case of parties devoid of funds or
subject to legal limitations, as may be the case with government
parties, there may be need to invoke the principle of absorption
by the court, drawing on funds appropriated to the judiciary for
miscellaneous expenses.
(iv) Objections to the Proposal
The matter is not open and shut. Judge Wyzanski has
apparently repented the procedure he followed in appointing
Carl Kaysen, a distinguished economist and now head of the
Institute for Advanced Study at Princeton, as his law clerk
during the year he was considering United Shoe Machinery Corp. v.
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United States. 169 That opinion is a landmark, and was affirmed by
the Supreme Court without further opinion. 70 A few years ago
Judge Wyzanski noted in an* address that the procedure had
been challenged by Bethuel Webster, and that on reflection he
thought Mr. Webster was right.171 His central point seems to
have been that in this recondite field the judge did not have
ability equal to that of his economist law clerk, and that the judge
did not have requisite independence when the assistant had, in
effect, "mastery" over the judge through superior technical abil-
ity, learning and experience. Judge Wyzanski felt that he had
used a superior technique in a later case, apparently a radar
patent case, in which he named an outstanding expert as a
master and required that he confer with each of the parties and
staff in the presence of the other and prepare a report which
would be submitted to both parties. The master would then be
subject to examination by each party in open court on the
witness stand.
While the issue is close, I think there is room, both in
practical necessity and in ,the legal structure, for access by an
appellate judge to a scientific assistant, with whom he could
communicate in private, as with his law clerk, orally as well as in
writing. Certainly a system which enhances understanding by the
judge is preferable to one in which the judge must grab, or stab,
at a record that seems to be important but which incorporates
confusing and extraneous impressions. If this happens in the
jury room, when a choice must be made between two experts
and one is taken to be more sagacious than the other by reason
of his gray hair, friendly smile or mild demeanor, at least the
damage is confined to an individual case. Also, there are so many
nonrational aspects of the jury system that this one is not
particularly obtrusive. But to require environmental decisions to
be delayed and possibly upset by a court on the basis of similarly
superficial aspects of what appears in the hearing record seems
to me to make perfection the enemy of progress.
169 United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295 (D. Mass. 1953),
affd, 347 U.S. 521 (1954).
70 347 U.S. 521 (1954).
171 Wyzanski, The Law of Change, 38 N.M.Q. 5, 19 (1968). For a thoughtful view that
the economist's only sound role in antitrust cases is as a witness, not as a master or ex
parte expert in any guise, see Webster, The Use of Economics Experts as Witnesses in Antitrust
Litigation, 17 THE RECORD 456 (1962) (speech made at Third Circuit Judicial
Conference). For views that an economist should not again be made a judge's law clerk,
see Kaysen, An Economist as the Judge's Law Clerk in Sherman Act Cases, 12 ABA ANTrrRUST
SECTION REPORT 43 (1958); Webster & Hogeland, The Economist in Chambers and in Court,
id. 50.
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Even if no jury is involved, there remain significant differ-
ences between the trial judge and the appellate panel that may
render Judge Wyzanski's current views less telling in the context
of appellate review. Susceptibility to "excessive" influence is
substantially lessened, for instance, when the tribunal consists of
more than one judge, as points of view not affected by consulta-
tion with an aid offer a tempering influence. The danger is
further reduced by the fact that the trial judge usually has the
function of deciding issues of fact, whereas the appellate court
determines only whether there is a rational and legitimate basis
for the resolution of the facts by others. The appellate court,
therefore, may rely on the general guidance of an aid, his
translation, as it were, from a recondite language, without having
to accept advice on whether a given view of the factual issues is
"correct" or not.
In a final response to the concern that the influence of a
scientific aid might become excessive, I would again emphasize
the analogy to the law clerk rather than the expert witness. This
view is informed by a sense that any institutional program for
supplying scientific aids will evolve more naturally and effec-
tively, and with less of a threat to judicial independence, if the
scientists involved are asked to serve as "assistants" to the court
panel.
VI. CONCLUSION
The ultimate answer on how courts should be organized to
respond to environmental issues depends on which tribunal can
best serve the objective of judicial review. One objective is to
provide supervision that emphasizes broad questions of fairness.
Another objective is to combine supervision with restraint, mak-
ing the courts a genuine kind of partner with the agency in the
overall administrative process. We had that very much in mind
in International Harvester in the fashioning of the opinion and
remand order. In the remand proceeding, 172 the Administrator
was, at least in my impression, both intent on complying with the
requirement of our opinion and order, and able to use the
concepts set forth by the court as a new point of reference for
marshaling the materials and probing the central issues. He
frequently referred to his findings and conclusions as both in
1 onore Applications for Suspension of 1975 Moto, Vehicle Emission Standards,
Decision of the Administrator on Remand, 38 Fed. Reg. 10317 (1973).
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compliance with the court's order and in furtherance of the
public interest.
Thus the Administrator set out to analyze the problem of
the extent of feasible automotive emission control by 1975, in
light of broad considerations of the public interest outlined in
the opinion; made a showing of the reliability of the methodol-
ogy used to predict the ability to conform with proposed interim
standards, including an estimate of the statistical significance of
its prediction; and made a presentation on the basis of a detailed
analysis of the record. The court's decision apparently provided
a useful structure for his decision, especially in terms of the
burden of proof which he was expected to carry. Yet the Ad-
ministrator was able and willing to explore on his own initiative
new avenues of decision and partial decision.
The common theme one can draw from these observations
on the role of the courts in environmental matters is the court's
central role of ensuring the principled integration and balanced
assessment of both environmental and nonenvironmental con-
siderations in federal agency decisionmaking. The rule of ad-
ministrative law, as applied to the congressional mandates for a
clean environment, ensures that mission-oriented agencies,
where NEPA is applied, will take due cognizance of environmen-
tal matters. It ensures at the same time that environmental
protection agencies will take into account the congressional
mandate that environmental concern be reconciled with other
social and economic objectives of our society. The courts have
been selected by Congress to provide an "independent" review of
the decisions involved. This conjoins effective supervision with
restraint. The path that lies ahead is to improve the capability of
the courts to apply the rule of administrative law to the en-
vironmental area, in which special problems of complexity are
presented.
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